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To the memory of Carlos Edgard Harle1
Of his final endeavors in connection with mathematical knowledge, the
last word has still not been spoken. But when in this field a further
development is possible, it will not bypass Hilbert but go through him.
— Arnold Sommerfeld, in his eulogy for David Hilbert
Abstract
In this article, I focus on the resiliency of the P=?NP problem. The
main point to deal with is the change of the underlying logic from first
to second-order logic. In this manner, after developing the initial steps
of this change, I can hint that the solution goes in the direction of the
coincidence of both classes, i.e., P=NP.
1 Introduction
In her wonderful biography of David Hilbert, Constance Reid [15, p. 153]
mentions Hilbert’s opinions about mathematical problems and mathemati-
cians, by using the expression “worthwhile problems.” I would rather prefer
the word “resilient” instead of “worthwhile,” due perhaps to the subjectiv-
ity of the latter. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “resilient”
1Carlos Edgard Harle was a Brazilian-German mathematician, deceased on January 16,
2020 at the age of 82. His dignified life has been entirely devoted to academia: to research,
student-advising and to the teaching of mathematics. He was the first mathematician to
discover the concept of isoparametric families of submanifolds. On this occasion, it is an
undisputable matter of justice to honor him, both as scholar and man.
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as Resuming the original shape or position after being bent, compressed, or
stretched. In other words, “resilient problems in mathematics” are those
that resist attempts to their solution for a (relatively) long time, or have
long proofs, which might turn them to be difficult to solve. In Go¨del’s arti-
cle over the length of proofs [6, p. 397], he expressed the following statement:
Thus, passing to the logic of the next higher order has the
effect, not only of making provable certain propositions that were
not provable before, but also of making possible to shorten, by
an extraordinary amount, infinitely many of the proofs already
available.
Perhaps to make mathematical proofs shorter, it occurred to me trying to de-
velop second-order logic, my intention being to discuss here the initial steps
of such a development. It has been widely spread out in the foundational
folklore that each standard model of set theory has its own second-order
logic, and therefore, a universal system for it, as in the first-order case, sim-
ply does not exist. Be as it may, the aim at developing second-order logic
presupposes the philosophical commitment to an objective reality of sets (or
some other entities) to be called The Absolute, and considered as the uni-
verse of all mathematical happenings. This has been eloquently conveyed
as a “genuine problem” by Professor Abraham Robinson [16, p. 556]:
The particular problem in the philosophy of mathematics
that has the greatest fascination for me — and I maintain that
it is a genuine problem — is that of the existence, or reality, or
intelligibility, or objectivity, of infinite totalities.
The preceding considerations remind me the outstanding logician and
Berkeley mathematics professor, Jack Howard Silver. It is widely known
that Silver did have strong reservations as to the existence of measurable
cardinals, despite the fact that his doctoral dissertation was fully based
on Ramsey cardinals, an easy consequence of the existence of measurable
cardinals. In a speech delivered by the great mathematician P. J. Cohen at
Stanford University, he expressed his unbelief on the existence of inaccessible
cardinals, for they were too large.2 Silver himself had reservations about the
consistency of ZF set theory, and I caught somewhere in the internet remarks
about his suspicions of third-order number theory. In that case, mathematics
would be reduced simply to number theory and analysis. Since set theory
2For those interested in the subject of large cardinals, let me recommend Kanamori’s
masterpiece [10].
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still arises doubts in the minds of a few mathematicians, why not develop
second-order logic in number theory? That’s what I will do, and at the end
I’ll make some remarks of how these ideas can be extended to set theory.
In September 1917, Hilbert visited Zu¨rich where he delivered a talk which
according to Reid [15, p. 151] . . . was devoted to a favorite subject — the
importance of the role of mathematics in the sciences — and might have been
entitled “In praise of the axiomatic method.” There he brought up certain
questions which I would rather call Foundational Questions that I mention
in the sequel:
FQ 1. The problem of the solvability in principle of every mathemat-
ical question.
FQ 2. The problem of finding a standard of simplicity for mathemat-
ical proofs.
FQ 3. The problem of the relation of content and formalism in math-
ematics.
FQ 4. The problem of the decidability of a mathematical question by
a finite procedure.
I dare saying that, as our science progresses, all of the foundational questions
above will be fully and positively answered in the framework of second-order
logic. To tackle FQ 1, I would like to rephrase it in the following way: The
language of mathematics (in our case, number theory) is consistent and
complete. This brings us immediately to two stumbling blocks: Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems [5] and Lindstro¨m’s model-theoretic characteriza-
tion of first-order logic [23]. Let me quote a small passage in Cohen’s book
[2, p. 1]: “ . . . Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem still represents the greatest
obstacle to a satisfactory philosophy of mathematics.”
To circumvent Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, I chose to extend fur-
ther the language of first-order number theory, or Peano’s arithmetic; let
me substantiate this move by quoting Hilbert [15, p. 177]:
“Let us remember that we are mathematicians and that as
mathematicians we have often been in precarious situations from
which we have been rescued by the ingenious method of ideal
elements . . .. Similarly, to preserve the simple formal rules of
aristotelian logic, we must supplement the finitary statements
with ideal statements.”
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And according to the concluding remark in Reid [15, p. 177]:
Mathematics, under this view, would become a stock of two
kinds of formulas: first, those to which the meaningful commu-
nications correspond and, secondly, other formulas which signify
nothing but which are the ideal structure of the theory.
And she proceeds by quoting Hilbert again:
“But in our general joy over this achievement, and in our
particular joy over finding that indispensable tool, the logical
calculus, already developed without any effort on our part, we
must not forget the essential condition of the method of ideal
elements — a proof of consistency.”
As we see, the first-order language of Peano’s arithemetic will be broad-
ened to shelter the ideal elements of the new language. Another purpose is to
prevent the definability of the new language within itself, thus precluding the
derivation of the incompleteness theorems. To this end, I interpret the new
formulas as having an infinitary (non-well-founded) tree-like format, whose
content in the nodes is similar to the older first-order situation. If the newer
language turns out to be non-definable within itself, we might then suppose
that the corresponding axiomatic system is consistent and complete. As to
the non-validity of Lindstro¨m’s theorem, my excuses will be lighter, by just
mentioning that the emergent language is not a set, and therefore, external
to set theory. Thus, Lindstro¨m’s theorem does not apply. Each language
of this class will be referred to as an infinitary first-order number theoretic
language.3
2 Infinitary first-order languages
Perhaps it would be easier to introduce infinitary first-order formulas by
means of an example. Consider, for instance, the formula which expresses
induction in number theory for φ(x):
(φ(0) ∧ (∀x(φ(x)→ φ(Sx)))→ (∀xφ(x))).
In polish notation this formula is somewhat more weird:
→ ∧φ0∀x→ φxφSx∀xφx.
3During the seventies, I was told that the great Alfred Tarski mentioned the following
saying: The infinitary sentences will constitute the future of logic. But I doubt very much
that Tarski had in mind the (infinitary) sentences that are being considered here.
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Finally, in tree form it acquires the following shape:
→
∧
φ0 ∀x
→
φx φSx
∀x
φx
As we see, the notion of formula in tree-form can easily be extended to infini-
tary trees, which will turn out to be non-well-founded, i.e., they will admit
infinite branches. The concept of free and bound occurrences of variables
can be carried through straightforwardly to the new context as well as the
substitution of variables, free or bound, without collisions. Also the notion
of sub-formula is pretty much easy to infer. Now, it is time to give precise
definitions:
Definition 1 An infinitary first-order number theoretic formula is given by
a tree, (possibly) non-well-founded, satisfying the following conditions:
1. The total number of variables, free or bound, is finite;
2. each node is either a boolean connective ∧ (conjuction), ∨ (disjuction),
¬ (negation), → (implication), ↔ (equivalence); or a quantifier ∀vn
(universal), ∃vn (existential);
3. terminal nodes are atomic formulas of number theory t1 = t2, t1 < t2,
where t1, t2 are terms built from variables v0, v1, · · · , vn · · · , or from
the constant 0, through the application of the functional symbols +
(sum), ∗ (multiplication) or S (successor); or may be given by symbols
denoting continuing further trees.
An infinitary first-order number theoretic language L+ is a collection
of infinitary first-order number theoretic formulas satisfying the following
conditions:
1. L+ includes all atomic formulas;
2. L+ is closed under boolean combinations and first-order quantifica-
tions;
3. L+ is closed under the operation of taking sub-formulas;
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4. L+ is closed under substitution of free or bound variables without col-
lisions.
The reader should keep in mind the following observations:
• the total number of variables in an infinitary first-order formula is
finite, but not necessarily the number of their occurrences, which may
be infinite;
• an infinitary first-order number theoretic language is not necessarily a
set, but includes the first-order language for number theory, which is
a set.
To finish this section, I will provide some notation to be used through-
out the rest of the exposition: the first-order language for number theory
will be denoted by LNT; its second-order language, by L
(2)
NT
; and a general
infinitary first-order language for number theory will be designated by L+;
I will characterize in a later section a special language for infinitary first-
order number theory, bridging the gap between first and second-order logic,
that will be denoted by L+
NT
. Finally, I would point out that amongst the
infinitary first-order number theoretic languages there are two which are
extreme: a minimal, L+(inf), formed by short formulas only, and a maximal,
L+(max), containing all infinitary formula-trees. Both are sets. A generic
infinitary first-order number theoretic language L+ is in between the two,
which entails that all formulas are sets, but not necessarily all languages
L+:
L+(inf) ⊆ L
+ ⊆ L+(max).
3 Proofs and Decisions
Before entering the subject of proofs and decisions, let me make a few re-
marks regarding the metamathematics of second-order logic. As said before,
the metamathematical syntactical notions can be translated almost verbatim
from first to second-order logic. But since in the latter we are dealing with
infinitary formulas, a few adjustments are pertinent, mainly to maintain the
finitary spirit of metamathematics.
First of all, it is always possible to distinguish between object language
and metalanguage proofs. The first are, so to speak, internal to the theory,
and therefore, when we have in mind a model, the object language proofs are
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seated within. On the other hand, metalanguage proofs are always external,
finitary and concrete, whereas in the first-order case, they might be infinitary
and non-standard. In the framework of second-order logic, however, such
a phenomenon should never happen, and proofs, metatheoretical or object
language-like are always finitary or, to put it another way, isomorphic. Thus,
for instance, were we able to succeed in showing within the second-order
framework that ZF is first-order inconsistent, i.e., to derive the sentence
¬Con(pZFq) in number theory, the internal proof of inconsistency could in
principle be retrieved to a fully fledged proof of the metalanguage.
But, since we are dealing with infinitary objects in a proof, how is it
that we are going to preserve finiteness? The answer to this question is sim-
ple: just consider the infinitary tree-formulas as potentially infinite objects.
Since the proof-theoretical elements only depend on the initial stages of in-
formation in the trees, and not on the entire content of the formula-tree, this
apparent limitation on the knowledge of formulas will not hurt the concept
of proof. For instance, consider the logical axiom Φ → (Ψ → Φ). It can be
easily seen that the knowledge of its being an axiom only depends on the
3 initial stages of its tree presentation, and not on the entire scope of its
displayed information:
→
Φ →
Ψ Φ
The notion of first-order proof is very well-known. For those interested
in looking this concept up, I vividly recommend Barwise’s essay [1, p. 34–35]
on first-order logic. As said before, the concept of proof can be translated
almost verbatim to infinitary first-order formulas. But I contend that in the
second-order context, the notion of decision has to be introduced, and I wish
to explain why. When in the context of first-order logic we prove a formula
φ(v0, . . . vk), what is really at stake is its universal closure, i.e., the sentence
∀v0 · · · ∀vkφ(v0, . . . , vk). Whereas in second-order logic, we are interested in
the validity of each instance φ(Sn00, . . . , Snk0) obtained through assigning
to each variable vi the term S
ni0 in the whole decision, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k. In
Decision Theory thus, the deductive rule of generalization cannot in general
possibly apply.
I begin by quoting Matijasevich [13, p. 38]:
The tenth problem is the only one of the 23 problems that
is (in today’s terminology) a decision problem; i.e., a problem
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consisting of infinitely many individual problems each of which
requires a definite answer: YES or NO. The heart of a decision
problem is the requirement to find a single method that will give
an answer to any individual subproblem.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Decision Theory has yet to be de-
veloped, I consider Proof theory and Decision Theory as sister theories. In
fact, given an infinitary first-order number theoretic L+, a sentence Σ ∈ L+
admits a proof in L+ if there is a finite sequence of formulas pi+ ⊂ L+ whose
last element is Σ such that pi+ is a number theoretic proof (including or not
some of the Peano’s axioms). On the other hand, a formula Φ(v0, . . . , vk) is
decided in L+ if there exist two finite sequences of formulas of L+, δ+ and
δ−, whose last elements are Φ(v0, . . . , vk) and ¬Φ(v0, . . . , vk) respectively,
such that for every sequence 〈Sn00, . . . , Snk0〉,
δ+(Sn00, . . . , Snk0) or δ−(Sn00, . . . , Snk0)
is a number theoretic proof. Here, δ+(Sn00, . . . , Snk0) (or its analogous
counterpart δ−(Sn00, . . . , Snk0)) is obtained by substituting all variables vi
in δ+ (resp. δ−) by Sni0. In case Σ is provable in L+, we use the notation
⊢L+ Σ. In case Φ(v0, . . . , vn) is decided in L
+, we use the notation L+
Φ(v0, . . . , vn) (for decision theory reminds me subjectively of Cohen’s notion
of forcing in set theory). To finish this section, let me remark that Proof
Theory is a subject linked to Foundational Question 2, whereas Decision
Theory, to Foundational Question 4.
4 The Absolute
The Absolute for number theory will be constituted by two components:
the set of natural numbers N and the predicates over numbers PN. The
Absolute A will be, so to speak, the union of these two components:4
A = 〈N,PN〉 = N ∪PN.
Predicates will be given by formulas of an infinitary language L+
NT
, to
be characterized in the sequel, and are linked to the Foundational Ques-
tion 3, whereas L+
NT
is connected to the Foundational Question 1. In order
to characterize L+
NT
, suppose we are given a numbering of all formulas of
L+(max) = 〈Φ0,Φ1, . . . ,Φn, . . .〉. I’m going to consider a sequence 〈Γn : nεN〉
4If the reader wishes, she might refer to A as a shortcut for Analysis.
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of infinitary first-order number theoretic languages satisfying the following
conditions:
1. Γ0 contains all infinitary first-order number theoretic languages, in-
cluding L+(max).
2. If L+ ∈ Γn, in order for L
+ to remain in Γn+1, it is necessary that
either Φn /∈ L
+ or Φn is decided in L
+, i.e., L+ Φn. Otherwise, L
+
is discarded when passing from Γn to Γn+1.
3. If L+ ∈ Γn is inconsistent with number theory, i.e., there is a short
sentence σ = Φn false in the standard model of number theory —
〈N,+, ∗, S,<, 0〉 |= ¬σ — then σ is decidable favorably by L+, i.e.,
L+ σ, and L
+ is discarded when passing from Γn to Γn+1.
It is fairly intuitive to check that any L+ belonging to all of the Γn is
consistent, complete and all of its short sentences are true in the standard
model of number theory. Besides, the sequence 〈Γn : n ∈ ω〉 is decreasing,
i.e.,
. . . ⊆ Γn+1 ⊆ Γn ⊆ . . . ⊆ Γ1 ⊆ Γ0.
Now, I allow myself to state axiomatically the following principle:
Monotonicity principle — There exists exactly one infinitary first-order
number theoretic language L+
NT
belonging to all of the Γn’s:
{L+
NT
} =
∞⋂
n=0
Γn.
Strictly speaking, I would have to consider the language L+
NT
as given by
a subsequence 〈Φn0 , . . .Φnk , . . .〉. But as I am prone to commit abuses, I’ll
commit them once again and always write L+
NT
= 〈Φ0, . . .Φn, . . .〉.
The reader might wonder how is it possible that L+
NT
is consistent and
complete, since we are using only plain first-order logic in our deductions.
The answer to this question lies in the fact that the used language is in-
finitary, and it might encode a lot of information about the universe in its
structure. Let me give an example that might be considered as a plausibility
argument. Consider the formula
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∀x
∨
x = 0 ∨
x = S0 ∨
x = SS0 ∨
...
I am not willing to say that this formula necessarily belongs to L+
NT
. But it
is intuitive to check that it encloses a lot of information about N.
Now I’ll come to grips with Foundational Question 3: my contention
is that mathematical objects are self-referential predicates, i.e., predicates
of a language whose predicates refer to themselves. In order to make this
assertion clear, I initially must say what a predicate of a language is, and
I restrict myself to predicates of L+
NT
. As we have seen, this language is
supposed to be consistent and complete. Well, suppose we are given two
formulas of L+
NT
, Φ(v0, . . . , vn) and Ψ(v0, . . . , vn) (with the same number of
free variables). Clearly, they are associated to two predicates. We say that
Φ and Ψ define the same predicte if they are equivalent with respect to the
deductive system of L+
NT
:
⊢+
NT
∀v0 . . . ∀vn(Φ(v0, · · · , vn)↔ Ψ(v0, . . . , vn)).
This definition was given by using proof theory, but it might have been given
decision theoretically:

+
NT
Φ(v0, · · · , vn)⇔ 
+
NT
Ψ(v0, · · · , vn).
In general, a number theoretic predicate is determined by a formula of
L+
NT
. The predicate determined by the formula Φ(v0, . . . , vn) will be denoted
by
JΦ(v0, . . . vn)K.
But sometimes I’ll commit abuses by identifying a predicate to its defining
formula: JΦ(v0, . . . vn)K ≈ Φ(v0, . . . vn). This relates our considerations to
the Foundational Question 3.
The definition of satisfaction and truth in the Absolute A is a plain
Tarski-style definition, individual variables ranging over numbers in N, and
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predicate variables ranging over predicates over numbers in PN. As I will
need truth for existential second-order formulas only, I’ll make it explicit: let
∃Xϕ(X; v0, . . . vn) an existential (short) formula of L
(2)
NT
. We will suppose,
without loss of generality, that there is only one second-order quantification
in the outer side of the formula. All of the others have been collapsed into
a single one by means of suitable pairing functions. Then, in case A |=
∃Xϕ(X; v0, . . . , vn)[a0/v0, . . . an/vn] one can find a formula Φ(v0, . . . , vn) ∈
L+
NT
satisfying the condition
⊢+
NT
ϕ(X; v0, . . . , vn)[Φ/X; a0/v0, . . . an/vn].
Φ/X means that I have replaced X in ϕ by the instances of Φ obtained
through the substitution of v0, . . . vn by the corresponding variables in the
occurrence of X that is being replaced.
5 P=NP
After having developed the prolegomena in previous sections, the second-
order machinery is ready to be used to show the main consequence of this
article, which is an answer to the P=?NP problem. The argument will be
short and easy. It uses one of the theorems of Descriptive Complexity, due
to Ron Fagin [9, p. 3]:
Theorem 2 (Fagin) A set of structures T is in NP iff there exists a
second-order existential formula, ∃Xϕ such that T = {A : A |= p∃Xϕq}.
Formally, NP = SO∃.
Before going into the argument per se, let me offer a clarifying of a few
concepts: the first-one is the notion of a tree-presentation and the second is
the finitization of a tree through one of its tree-presentations. As we know,
a formula-tree Φ is a potentially infinite object and we can represent it by
an initial sub-tree having in some of its final nodes full sub-trees. Any such
representation of Φ will be called a tree-presentation of Φ; I consider it to
be a finite object.
It is also possible to “finitize” entirely the presentation of a tree by
replacing formulas in end nodes by relational symbols. For instance, consider
the tree Φ(x, y) given by
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∨x = y ∨
Ψ(x, y) ∃z
∧
Φ(x, z) Φ(z, y)
If we substitute E∗ for Φ and E for Ψ in the above formula, we obtain [9,
p. 217]:
E∗(x, y) ≡ x = y ∨ E(x, y) ∨ ∃z(E∗(x, z) ∧ E∗(z, y)).
In the general case, since I am considering the language L+
NT
as an infinite
sequence of formula-trees, L+
NT
= 〈Φ0, . . .Φn, . . .〉, what I do is to take an
infinite sequence of relational symbols 〈R0, . . . ,Rn, . . .〉, each Rn having the
same arity of its corresponding Φn, and substitute each Rn in the end nodes
of the presentation for Φn.
Now, I break the main proof into a few steps:
1. Let T S be an NP-complete problem. Then, by Fagin’s theorem
2 given above we may find a short existential second-order formula
∃Xϕ(X) which may supposed to be concrete, such that T S = {A :
A |= p∃Xϕq}.
2. A can be intuitively thought as constituting a finite database, with
universe |A| of length n encoded in number theory:
T S(A)↔ A |= p∃Xϕq.
3. Let Tr
(A)
N
be the truth definition for formulas of length ≤ lh(∃Xϕ) =
N in the database A. It follows that
T S(A)↔ Tr
(A)
N
(p∃Xϕq)
4. Let’s fix a database A in T S. It follows that A |= Tr
(A)
N
(p∃Xϕq).
From the definition of Tr
(A)
N
, we derive that A |= ∃XTr
(A)
N
(pϕ(X)q)[X/pXq].
This comes from the fact that
Tr
(A)
N
(p∃Xϕq)↔ (∃Xϕ)(A) ↔ ∃X(X ⊆ |A| ∧ ϕ(A)).
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5. By the definition of truth in the Absolute A for existential statements
given at the end of the previous section, it follows that there exists a
formula Φ(A; v0, . . . vM−1) ∈ L
+
NT
such that ⊢+
NT
Tr
(A)
N
(pϕ(X)q)[Φ/pXq].
It should be clear that if S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1 satisfy Φ(A; v0, . . . , vM−1),
i.e., ⊢+
NT
Φ(A;S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1), then each S0ni ∈ |A|, for 0 ≤ i ≤
M − 1.
6. Now, let’s fix our attention to formula Φ(A; v0, . . . vM−1) ∈ L
+
NT
. For
this formula, there exists a pair of decisions δ−, δ+ such that for every
finite sequence 〈S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1〉 ∈ |A|M , either δ−(S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1)
is a proof of ¬Φ(A;S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1) or δ+(S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1) is a
proof of Φ(A;S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1).
7. As we see, for each database A a relation RA(v0, . . . , vM−1) is associ-
ated to the formula Φ by means of the pair of decisions δ−, δ+. For
the fixed database A, each M -tuple 〈S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1〉 ∈ |A|M is de-
cided to satisfy RA by a process of checking whether two sequences of
formulas, δ−(S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1) and δ+(S0n0 , . . . , S0nM−1), which one
is a proof. This is a process accomplished in polynomial time.
8. Just for the sake of completeness, I’m going to state the Immerman-
Vardi theorem [9, p. 217]:
Theorem 3 (Immerman-Vardi). A problem is in polynomial time
if and only if it is describable in first-order logic with the addition of
the least-fixed-point operator. This is equivalent to being expressible
by a first-order formula iterated polynomially many times. Formally,
P = FO(LFP) = FO[nO(1)].
9. We now use the stated theorem (of Immerman-Vardi [7], [22]) to
derive that the relation RA(v0, . . . , vM−1) is describable using first-
order logic with the addition of the least-fixed-point operator, i.e.,
RA(v0, . . . , vM−1) ∈ FO(LFP).
10. Finally, to check whether A ∈ T S one must verify whether A |=
pϕq[RA/pXq], which is also a polynomial procedure, since
FO(FO(LFP))=FO(LFP).
Thus, T S is in P, and since T S is NP-complete, P=NP.
I would like to end this section with a few remarks:
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• In the eagerness to prove the previous result, I tried without success
to use the Immerman-Vardi theorem [7], [22], by showing that the
relation RA(v0, . . . , vM−1) can be obtained by means of the fixed point
operator. I think it to be an approach worth trying.
• I would like to make it plainly clear that I do not consider the argument
above as a solution to the P=?NP problem. This stems from the fact
that Decision Theory has not been developed yet. But I haven’t given
up my hopes that computer scientists and logicians will in the future
develop it, and fully confirm the above given argument. For the time
being, I consider the P=?NP problem as completely open.
When asked about the P=?NP problem, Professor Donald Knuth thus
expressed himself [11, Question 17]:
Andrew Binstock, Dr. Dobb’s: “At the ACM Turing
Centennial in 2012, you stated that you were becoming convinced
that P=NP. Would you be kind enough to explain your current
thinking on this question, how you came to it, and whether this
growing conviction came as a surprise to you?”
Donald Knuth: “As you say, I’ve come to believe that P=NP,
namely that there does exist an integerM and an algorithm that
will solve every n-bit problem belonging to the class NP in nM
elementary steps.
Some of my reasoning is admittedly na¨ıve: It’s hard to believe
that P 6= NP and that so many brilliant people have failed to
discover why. On the other hand if you imagine a number M
that’s finite but incredibly large — like say the number 10 ↑↑↑↑ 3
discussed in my paper on “coping with finiteness” — then there’s
a humongous number of possible algorithms that do nM bitwise
or addition or shift operations on n given bits, and it’s really
hard to believe that all of those algorithms fail.
My main point, however, is that I don’t believe that the
equality P=NP will turn out to be helpful even if it is proved,
because such a proof will almost surely be nonconstructive. Al-
though I thinkM probably exists, I also think human beings will
never know such a value. I even suspect that nobody will even
know an upper bound on M .
Mathematics is full of examples where something is proved
to exist, yet the proof tells us nothing about how to find it.
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Knowledge of the mere existence of an algorithm is completely
different from the knowledge of an actual algorithm.”
I certainly agree with what Professor Knuth expresses, but I must men-
tion that in the history of mathematics, there has occurred a strange, yet
astonishing episode. The young David Hilbert solved the famous invariant
problem, first by proving that a finite basis for the full system of invariants
does exist, a strict existential proof5. Afterwards, from the existence of a
finite basis, Hilbert was able to produce a full constructive proof. Maybe an
analogous fact will happen with the P=?NP problem.
In a paper published by the Journal of Automated Reasoning [21], Ruedi-
ger Thiele and Larry Wos discuss a presumable twenty fourth Hilbert prob-
lem, hidden in his massive files in Germany. The problem dealt with finding
simpler proofs and criteria for measuring simplicity. Furthermore, the au-
thors still discuss and analyse some methods of solution to the problem.
Notwithstanding the fact that this stems from Hilbert, this simplifying pro-
gram for proofs might help finding a constructive proof from the existence
of a polynomial algorithm for the travelling salesman problem.
6 Some Afterthoughts
To finish this article, I would like to make a few observations and raise a few
questions which I think to be pertinent and related to second-order logic; I
would rather shared them with you.
6.1 Second-order logic
One of the most important problems connected to the ideas exposed in this
article is the development of a deductive system for second-order logic, to-
gether with a completeness theorem, as it has been done for the first-order
case. In order to accomplish it, we need to characterize the set-theoretical
Absolute, which hopefully should be possible to do as it was done here, for
number theory. The deductive system would need ZF amongst its axioms,
and the completeness theorem should be carried out by taking all the or-
dinals, in correspondence with the first-order case which took only a set of
newer constants. The second-order model for the given theory should be a
full second-order model, which means that the set of theoretical predicates
of the construing model would essentially coincide with the power set of the
5which lead Paul Gordan to declare that this was Theology.
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model’s universe. To do it, we need a full reflection principle on the length
and encode the theory in the language of second-order ZF. A question that
remains to be tackled with is whether the sentences derived in the deduc-
tive system are equivalent to existential second-order sentences, a fact that
is valid in finite model theory under the hypothesis that P=NP. Finally,
a second remark worth doing is that the formulas of the language L+
ZF
are
sets, but the language itself is external to the set theoretical Absolute. This
would arise difficulties in the development of the second-order deductive sys-
tem, obliging us to use only finitely many or a recursively denumerable set
of formulas out of L+
ZF
. This attempt could bring to light some of Silver
glimpses into the nature of the set-theoretical Absolute. In the enlarged
theory, I would not be surprised if in second-order ZF the power set axiom
could be applied just once, to the set ω.
6.2 The continuum problem
This problem appeared in the beginnings of set theory with Cantor. Essen-
tially, what it is asked is the number of elements of the real line R measured
by cardinals, or ℵ’s. Go¨del showed that in the constructible world L, the
power of the continuum is ℵ1 (in L): 2
ℵ0
L
= ℵL1 . He thus obtained his
famous proof of consistency of the continuum hypothesis. Cohen, in his cel-
ebrated work, proved that the continuum problem is also independendent of
the axioms of set theory. In his book, he thus expressed himself [2, p. 151]:
“A point of view which the author feels may eventually come
to be accepted is that CH is obviously false. The main reason one
accepts the Axiom of Infinity is probably that we feel it absurd
to think that the process of adding only one set at a time can
exhaust the entire universe. Similarly with the higher axioms
of infinity. Now ℵ1 is the set of countable ordinals and this is
merely a special and the simplest way of generating a higher
cardinal, The set C is, in contrast, generated by a totally new
and more powerful principle, namely the Power Set Axiom. It is
unreasonable to expect that any description of a larger cardinal
which attempts to build up that cardinal from the Replacement
Axiom can ever reach C. Thus C is greater than ℵn, ℵω, ℵα,
where α = ℵω etc. This point of view regards C as an incredibly
rich set given to us by one bold new axiom, which can never be
approached by any piecemeal process of construction. Perhaps
later generations will see the problem more clearly and express
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themselves more eloquently.”
Foreman, Magidor and Shelah [14] as well as Woodin [26, 27], by adjoin-
ing new principlles to ZF, showed that the power of the continuum is ℵ2, a
result much cherished by Go¨del himself. In the late sixties, William Rein-
hardt mentioned a “reflection principle on the width” and derived from it
that the power of the continuum is very large, a weakly inaccessible cardinal.
Nevertheless this result has never been published. The closest result that
I could find in the literature was Takeuti’s Hypothesis 3 on the power set
[20, p. 440], very akin to Reinhardt’s principle. Let me suggest studying the
possibility of defining the set theoretical Absolute together with a reflection
principle on the width to derive that the power of the continuum is very
large.
6.3 Second-order computability and quantum computers
The most outstanding theories of twentieth century physics are unquestion-
ably Relativity theory and Quantum mechanics. Both theories have been
married for almost a century, and they still do not communicate well. Rel-
ativity is a classical theory par excellence [8], and Quantum mechanics is
what it is [17]. Both theories are observer oriented.
The great physicist David Deutsch modelled a universal Turing machine
for quantum computers in the eighties [3]. He even stated a proposal that
the Church-Turing thesis has a physical counterpart. Let me also suggest
that classical physics is tied to first-order computability, linked to tradi-
tional Turing machines, descending from first-order proof theory. Whereas
quantum Turing machines owed their origins to second-order computability,
stemming from decision theory.
After Cohen’s discoveries, Professors Dana Scott and Bob Solovay devel-
oped independently, (and never published) the startling theory of Boolean
valued models, and proved that it is in a certain sense “equivalent” to Co-
hen’s forcing. Since we relate in this section quantum theory to decision
theory, and since quantum mechanics is probabilistic in a multi-varied num-
ber of interpretations, there might be a relationship in the development of
decision theory with the Scott-Solovay methods.
6.4 The revival of Hilbert’s formalist program
Hilbert’s formalist program for the foundations of mathematics suffered a
major setback with Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, despite the fact that
Go¨del himself did not agree [5, p. 195] to it:
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I wish to note expressly that Theorem XI (and the corre-
sponding results for M and A)6 do not contradict Hilbert’s for-
malist viewpoint. For this viewpoint presupposes only the exis-
tence of a consistency proof in which nothing but finitary means
of proof is used, and it is conceivable that there exist finitary
proofs that cannot be expressed in the formalism of P (or of M
or A).
It is plausible that Hilbert’s formalist program could be revived in our
setting, since the formulas of L+
NT
are potentially infinite but nevertheless fi-
nite objects, and therefore, Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem no longer
applies. If such a program is to be revived, we could start from and consider
Finite Model Theory, even enriched with infinitary first-order formulas, as
consistent.
6.5 A global overview of classical mathematics
By classical mathematics, at least in this article, I mean both versions of
number theory, in first and second order logic. This is equivalent to saying
that the hardcore of classical mathematics coincides with number theory
and analysis. Nevertheless, such an assertion does not mean that set theory
is being left out from classical mathematics, as we shall immediately see.
First of all, as mentioned in subsection 6.4, and as a result of bypassing
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems, the possibility of reviving Hilbert’s for-
malistic program opens up again. I am firmly convinced that this will turn
out to be the case. It is widely accepted that our physical universe precludes
the actual infinite; therefore, actual infinite totalities may be considered as
ideal entities of the theories in which they appear. Allow me once again to
quote Mrs. Reid’s book [15, pp. 36–37.]:
“When Klein went to Chicago for what was billed as an “In-
ternational Congress of Mathematicians” to celebrate the found-
ing of the University of Chicago, he took with him a paper by
Hilbert in which that young man matter-of-factly summarized
the history of invariant theory and his own part in it:
In the history of a mathematical theory the developmen-
tal stages are easily distinguished: the naive, the formal, and
6Theorem XI is Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, M is the axiom system for
set theory, A is von Neumann’s axiomatization of classical mathematics [24], and P is
Principia Mathematicae.
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the critical. As for the theory of algebraic invariants, the first
founders of it, Cayley and Sylvester, are together to be regarded
as the representatives of the naive period: in the drawing up of
the simplest invariant concepts and in the elegant applications
to the solution of equations of the first degrees, they experi-
enced the immediate joy of first discovery. The inventors and
perfecters of the symbolic calculation, Clebsch and Gordan, are
the champions of the second period. The critical period finds its
expressions in the theorems I have listed above . . .
The theorems he referred to were his own.”
The foundations of mathematics go hand-in-hand with the foundations
of set theory, and I see a mirroring between the development of the theory
of invariants and that of set theory: the latter also had its na¨ıve period,
featuring Bolzano, Dedekind and Cantor; it then experienced its formal
period, beginning with Frege, Russell, Zermelo, Hilbert, Go¨del and Cohen,
until the present; I conjecture that its critical period will be realized with
the advent of second-order logic and the revival of Hilbert’s program. Such
a position could be underpinned through the remarkable results discovered
by Harvey Friedman [4]:
“We present a coherent collection of finite mathematical the-
orems some of which can only be proved by going well beyond
the usual axioms for mathematics. The proofs of these theorems
illustrate in clear terms how one uses the well studied higher in-
finities of abstract set theory called large cardinals in an essential
way in order to derive results in the context of the natural num-
bers. The findings raise the specific issue of what constitutes a
valid mathematical proof and the general issue of objectivity in
mathematics in a down to earth way.
Large cardinal axioms, which go beyond the usual axioms for
mathematics, have been commonly used in abstract set theory
since the 1960’s (e.g., see [19], [12]). We believe that the results
reported on here are the early stages of an evolutionary process
in which new axioms for mathematics will be commonly used in
an essential way in the more concrete parts of mathematics.”
As we see, the down to earth proofs of the stated mathematical theorems
require large cardinal axioms whose proof of consistency might perhaps be
obtained in second-order number theory, as developed in this article.
19
6.6 The Characteristica Universalis and Calculus Ratiocina-
tor
The Characteristica is considered as Leibniz’s dream: a formal system to
represent all knowledge together with a computational system to “decide”
all questions. It could be epitomized in Leibniz’s own words (translated by
Bertrand Russell in [18, p. 170]):
“If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of
disputation between two philosophers than between two accoun-
tants. For it would suffice to take their pencils in their hands, to
sit down with their slates and say to each other (with a friend
as witness, if they liked): Let us calculate.”
After Go¨del’s discovery of the incompleteness theorems, it became widely
agreed that Leibniz’s dream could never be materialized. This can also be
seen from Carnap’s notes taken in the Arkadencafe´, in December 23, 1929,
when Go¨del presumably would have thus expressed himself [25, p. 50]:
“We admit as legitimate mathematics certain reflections on
the grammar of a language that concerns the empirical. If one
seeks to formalize such a mathematics, then with each formaliza-
tion there are problems, which one can understand and express
in ordinary language, but cannot express in the given formal-
ized language. It follows (Brouwer) that mathematics is inex-
haustible: one must always again draw afresh from the ‘fountain
of intuition.’ There is, therefore, no Characteristica Universalis
for the whole of mathematics, and no decision procedure for the
whole mathematics. In each and every closed language there are
only countably many expressions. The continuum appears only
in ‘the whole of mathematics.’ . . . If we have only one language,
and can only make ‘elucidations’ about it, then these elucida-
tions are inexhaustible, they always require some new intuition
again, tin contrast with these remarks, G’s incompleteness the-
orem achieves the additional task of refining some of the ideas
expressed here to get propositions within the given formal sys-
tem, which go beyond it relative to provability.”
When Professor Abraham Robinson visited Bras´ılia, in the early seven-
ties, I asked him what were his thoughts about the Characteristica Univer-
salis. His answer was brief: “This is a project for the future.”Well, the future
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is now: I believe that second order number theory, whether developed as in
this article or not, together with the revival of Hilbert’s formalistic program
is the Characteristica Universalis with the Calculus Ratiocinator.
6.7 Theology
Finally, I would like to remark that my readings of Gershom Scholem made
me foresee a strong interaction between Theology and second-order logic,
bridging the gap and promoting the unavoidable intertwining of Spirituality
with the Foundations of Science.
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